control, including benchmarking, performance-related pay and privatization, was stressed. Such moves towards 'low trust' instruments were perceived to strike at the 'conventional' civil servant ethos and attracted considerable criticism. For example, the claim that privatized public services undermine bureaucratic ethics and democratic accountability relied on the 'paternalistic' argument that the nature of utility services prohibits informed choice (Haque, 1996 (Haque, , 1998 . Similarly, privatized services were said to be on an inevitable downward trend given the replacement of 'public interested' officials with 'profit-seeking' businesses, leading to increased inequality, unemployment and social marginalization (for New Zealand, see Kelsey, 1995) . Furthermore, the perceived lack of popular participation was criticized. By drawing on Hirschman's categories of exit and voice, it was argued that the introduction of exit (or choice) undermines the exercise of voice (Hirschman, 1970; Falconer and Ross, 1999, pp. 341-2) .
The second concern relates to the perceived lack of accountability of existing regimes (Baldwin and Cave, 1999) . The discussion has centred on methods of enhancing regulatory accountability by input-oriented means (ranging from procedural to monitoring devices, see Graham, 1997) or on the complexity of accountability (see Scott, 2000) . Few studies have approached the issue of transparency by focusing on the notion of consumer sovereignty (Hood, 1986, pp. 171-93) . Consumer sovereignty highlights as an 'ideal type' that a consumer should individually be able to choose the supplier, the nature and the amount of the provided good. By using this perspective, this chapter is therefore less concerned with ownership questions or constitutional law debates on parliamentary accountability, than with regulatory tools which facilitate the sovereign consumer.
Finally, the literature on regulatory regimes still lacks comparative perspectives, despite numerous explanations of regulatory change (Hood, 1994, pp. 19-36) . Studies on the welfare state and 'big government' have pointed to the persistence of 'families of nations' (see Castles, 1998) in the face of common, international challenges. Given the increasing amount of European legislation governing national regulatory regimes, this chapter questions whether there has been a move towards a common regulatory approach or a persistence of 'regulatory diversity' (Wilks, 1996) .
The following compares regulatory regimes within and across 'families of nations' (United Kingdom, New Zealand, Ireland, Sweden and Germany) in order to enquire whether there has been an emergence of a regulatory model with regard to 'consumer transparency'. A typology of transparency mechanisms is developed before their existence is assessed in a comparative analysis of regulatory regimes. It concludes by assessing issues of convergence and the complexity of transparency mechanisms.
